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CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
Religious Societies-Church Property Disputes-
The Implied Trust Doctrine
Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for
these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their
own particular tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their
own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it.
-Thomas Jefferson'
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dog-
ma, the establishment of no sect.-Justice Samuel F. Miller.2
The Christian church has been beset with disagreement and dissent
since its establishment. The differences within the early church' were
only preludes to the bitter disputes that eventually splintered the unified
church into hundreds of denominations and sects. Carl Zollmann, one of
the foremost authorities on American church law, calls these divisions,
or "schisms," within the church "blessings in disguise" and "the process
by which the living church continually adapts itself to the living society
upon which it operates." 4 While these schisms may be beneficial, they
are also painful, often leaving wounds that take centuries to heal and
scars that may never be erased.
Most disputes can be resolved within the church structure and do not
lead to discernable divisions. Only when the differences become irrecon-
cilable do the disputes overflow the confines of the church and become the
concern of society as a whole. Ultimately the problem of who has the right
to use and control the church property arises and must be resolved. The
parties must either turn to the service of an impartial agency of the commu-
nity or resort to force as a final arbiter. Society's interest in maintaining
settled property titles and social order thus makes the courts the natural
forums for church property disputes.
In a recent dispute within the Presbyterian Church in the United
States, the Supreme Court of Georgia answered the question of property
control in a novel fashion. In Presbyterian Church in the United States
I Quoted in A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 88 (1964).
2 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
'"I appeal to you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of
you agree and that there be no dissensions among you, but that you be united in
the same mind and the same judgment." I Corinthians 1:10 (rev. stand. version).
'C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 172 (Colum. ed. 1917).
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v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church,5 the general organization of the
Presbyterian Church was at odds with two dissident churches in Savan-
nah. Disagreement centered mainly on actions of the General Assembly,'
which had decided, among other things, that women could hold positions
in the church previously reserved for men. The two Savannah churches
also disagreed with the positions of the general church in the recent dis-
pute over required Bible reading in public schools, 7 United States involve-
ment in Vietnam, civil disobedience, predestination, and the general
church's membership in the National Council of Churches of Christ.'
In 1966, both local churches "withdrew" from the general church, claim-
ing that the General Assembly's stand violated the original tenets of faith
of the Presbyterian Church as set down in 1861.' The Presbytery of
Savannah I ° thereafter notified the two Savannah churches that it was
securing ministers for them and would maintain the church buildings for
those who desired to continue their relationship with the general church.
The Savannah churches sought judicial relief in the form of temporary
and permanent injunctions. A predominantly Baptist jury"1 found that
the general church had departed from the original tenets of faith, and
the court, accordingly, granted the requested relief.12 The Georgia Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's decision by overruling well-settled
precedent' and rejecting the argument that such a decision concerned
matters of faith, and was, therefore, an area protected from intrusion
by civil courts.' 4 The Georgia court explained that under the "implied
trust" doctrine, church property is impressed with an "implied trust"
for the benefit of the general church. When a local church is dis-
solved or withdraws from the denomination, 5 the doctrine operates
-224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968), cert. granted sub norn. Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Mem. Presby. Church, 392
U.S. 903 (1968).
'See generally PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, Boox or
CHURCH ORDER § 13-1 (rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Boox or CHURCH
ORDER].
'See Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 567 (1964).
8224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 692.
'The year of the formation of the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate
States of America. J. LESLIE, PRESBYTERIAN LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (1930).
" The Presbytery is the second highest church court. Boox OF CHURCH ORDER
§§ 13-1, 14-5.
"The Washington Post, May 4, 1968, § D, at 11, col. 5.
224 Ga. at - , 159 S.E.2d at 692-95.
18 See Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 184 (1907).
14224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 695-96.
The Georgia court reasoned that the two local churches were already out of
the general church's jurisdiction and, therefore, did not need to press an appeal
within the church structure to validate that separation. 224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d
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to give the local church property to the general church. However, the
doctrine allows the local church to retain control of the church property
by proving that the general church departed from the original tenets of
faith. The court, in awarding the property to the two local churches,
claimed "virtually unanimous"1 6 support for the rule's application to the
Savannah church property. 7
The "implied trust" doctrine invoked by the court in Eastern Heights
first appeared in England during the early nineteenth century. 8 The
English courts assumed that property obtained by a local church without
any express limitations as to its use was given with the intention that it
should be used for the promulgation of the church's faith as it existed at
the time of the conveyance. If the grantor of the property, or the donor of
the funds used for its purchase, had not specified these conditions, the
courts would imply them-hence the "implied trust." In case of a schism,
the property would go to the faction adhering to the tenets of faith as
they existed when the property was acquired."9
The English rule made little headway in the United States; in 1871 it
was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision
of Watson v. Jones.0 Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, recog-
nized that different forms of church government exist in this country.
Some churches operate as independent self-governing congregations, such
as the Congregational and Baptist denominations. These are labeled "con-
gregational" since matters of religious concern are settled by majority
vote of the church membership. Others, like the Presbyterians and Meth-
at 696. Contra, Evangelical Luth. Synod v. First English Luth. Church, 47 F.
Supp. 954, 962 (W.D. Okla. 1942).
224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 695.
x The court based its authority on a Georgia statute which appears to refer
only to "express trusts": "Courts are reluctant to interpose in questions affecting
the management of the temporalities of a church; but when property is devoted to
a specific doctrine or purpose, the courts will prevent it from being diverted from
the trust." GA. CODE ANN. § 22-408 (emphasis added). A careful reading of
the court's supporting cases reveals that they do not support the conclusions of the
court, and in many instances demand a contrary holding. See Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Saint John's Presbytery v. Central
Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1958); Presbytery of the Everglades v.
Morgan, 125 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961); Sapp v. Callaway, 208 Ga. 805, 69
S.E.2d 734 (1952); Tucker v. Paulk, 148 Ga. 228, 96 S.E. 339 (1918).
"' Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow 1, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.).
"
0 Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 418, 36 Eng. Rep.
135, 157 (Ch. 1817). For a thorough treatment of the history of the "implied
trust" doctrine, see Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church
Property, 75 HARv. L. Rlv. 1142, 1149-54 (1962).
2080 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). A minority faction of the Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church of Louisville sought control of the local church in defiance
of the general church. The dispute centered on the church's stand on slavery.
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odists, are governed by a series of church tribunals arranged in hier-
archical order.21 The decisions of these representative bodies are held to
be binding upon every congregation within the denomination.
When disputes arise in churches of the first type, Mr. Justice Miller
explained, the courts must look to the decision of the majority of the
congregation for the determination of matters involving religion. The
court would make no inquiry into the theological dispute. Likewise, in
decisions involving religious matters within a hierarchical church struc-
ture, the courts look to the proper church tribunal. The decision of the
church's highest tribunal is held binding upon the courts on matters of
doctrine and faith.23 Only in cases of an express trust for the support of
a specific religious doctrine would there be an inquiry by the courts into
the religious tenets of the church. This was the only circumstance in
which the Court found justification for making such an intrusion. 4
The Supreme Court further pointed out that the "implied trust" doc-
trine violates a basic principle of our government, that of the separation
of church and state.25 By voluntarily uniting with a church, the member
thereby bound himself to the church's rulings on religious matters.2, If
the courts interfered by inquiring into doctrine, it would undermine the
governmental structure of the church."
The great majority of American jurisdictions2s professed allegience
to the Watson rule, 9 but in practical application one modification became
21See, e.g., BooK oF CHURCH ORDER §§ 13-1, 14-5.
2 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725.2 Id. at 727. Sometimes determining into which category a church govern-
ment falls presents difficulty. See, e.g., Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123
N.E.2d 104 (1954); Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God,-- Md. - , 241 A.2d 691 (1968).
2" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23. See, e.g., Chatfield v. Dennington, 206 Ga.
762, 58 S.E.2d 842 (1950).
2 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. For a modern statement of the rule, see Maryland
and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, - Md. - - 241
A.2d 691, 697 (1968).
20 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728.27 Id. at 733.
28 The case was decided before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
and was therefore based on federal common law. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath.,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
2 Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966);
Evangelical Luth. Synod v. First English Luth. Church, 47 F. Supp. 954 (W.D.
Okla. 1942); Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319 (W.D. Mo. 1913); Bouchelle v. Trus-
tees of the Presby. Congreg., 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 A. 100 (1937); Stewart v. Jar-
riel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368 (1950); Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E. 184
(1907) (see note 13 supra); First Protest. Ref. Church v. DeWolf, 344 Mich. 624,
75 N.W.2d 19 (1956); Kelly v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 A. 736 (1938);
True Ref. Dutch Church v. Iserman, 64 N.J.L. 506, 45 A. 771 (1900) ; Tubreville
v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943). Two jurisdictions appear not to
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necessary. It was obvious that the decisions of ecclesiastical authorities
must be legitimate and derived by proper methods of procedure if they
were to be accepted at face value by the courts. An ecclesiastical due pro-
cess rule evolved which, when added to the original Watson rule, meant
that the decisions of the church would be accepted as final by the courts
provided there was fair play and substantial justice rendered in the pro-
cess.80 The resulting rule provided a workable formula for the courts"1
by keeping judicial inquiries into matters of religious doctrine to a mini-
mum, while allowing suitable recourse for parties in the face of misman-
agement.3 2
While rendering allegiance to Watson3 with one hand, however, the
state courts modified portions of the rule with the other. Despite the
Supreme Court's express rejection of the "implied trust" doctrine,34 it
have accepted the rule. See, e.g., Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805(1909); Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S.W. 169 (1911); but see Hayes
v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (1914).
" Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court: "In the absence of fraud, col-
lusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before
the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by
contract or otherwise." Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Arch., 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
See, e.g., Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893); Tubreville v.
Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943).
" There have been some exceptions. See, e.g., Master v. Second Parish, 124
F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941).
"'A similar rule is applied to other non-profit corporations such as fraternal
organizations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Prince Hall Grand Lodge, 183 Kan. 141, 325
P.2d 45 (1958).
" Watson may have been given constitutional status by the Supreme
Court in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). This decision
strongly implies that the "freedom of religion" concept applies not only to indi-
viduals, but also to church organizations. In this case, the Supreme Court struck
down a New York statute that prevented the Soviet-influenced hierarchy of the
Russian Orthodox Church from asserting control over its subordinate bodies with-
in the state. Mr. Justice Reed for the court concluded:
"Ours is a government which by the 'law of its being' allows no statute,
state or national, that prohibits the free exercise of religion. There are oc-
casions when civil courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of
church and state for the disposition or use of property .... Even in those
cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the
church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls. ...
This under our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there may be
free exercise of religion."
Id. at 120-21. (Citations omitted) See Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261
F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966); Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1123-39 (1965).
See generally Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 508 (1959).
c'80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725.
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
re-emerged under the cloak of the "fundamental change" doctrine.8u  Its
application, however, was limited to those disputes involving congrega-
tional polities where there was no forum of appeal except the civil courts.80
In a split involving a Baptist church, for example, the church property
would be awarded to that faction adhering to the original beliefs of the
church regardless of how many persons took the opposite view. If a
majority did not adhere to those beliefs, they were said to have forced a
"fundamental change" in the use of the church's property in disregard
of the wishes of those members who remained loyal to the faith.17 The
result was that of the "implied trust."
After Watson, the use of the term "trust" also emerged in cases in-
volving hierarchical polities. The term, however, was not employed in
the same sense as in the "implied trust" doctrine.88 Principally, its use
came from the lack of a better word to describe the Watson rule as applied
to disputes in hierarchical polities. It was a label used to denote the par-
ticular concept of property ownership that allowed a local church to use
and hold property in its own name-property that would, without excep-
tion, revert to the general church's control if the local church withdrew
from the general denomination. The Georgia court in Eastern Heights
apparently took the invasion of the term "trust" into disputes of hier-
archical church polities to mean that it should be employed in the same
way that the "implied trust" was applied to congregational polities under
the "fundamental change" doctrine. 9 The decisions, however, reveal a
contrary conclusion, for the only thing that the two procedures have in
" Specific guidelines for the rule have been almost impossible to formulate.
See, e.g., Ragsdall v. Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952);
Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943); Reid v. Johnston, 241
N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954). Until Eastern Heights, the Georgia courts re-jected any form of the "implied trust" doctrine. See, e.g., Sapp v. Callaway, 208
Ga. 805, 69 S.E.2d 734 (1952); Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368(1950).
"See, e.g., Saint John's Presby. v. Central Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714(Fla. 1958); Tucker v. Paulk, 148 Ga. 228, 96 S.E. 339 (1918); Ragsdall v.
Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952); Parker v. Harper, 295
Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943); Protestant Ref. Church v. Tempelman, 249
Minn. 182, 81 N.W.2d 839 (1957); Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114(1954).
", Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943).
" See, e.g., Presbytery of the Everglades v. Morgan, 125 So. 2d 762 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1961) ; Presbytery of Indianapolis v. First United Presby. Church, - Ind.
- , 238 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968); Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, 74
N.D. 400, 22 N.W.2d 625 (1946) ; Kelly v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 A. 736(1938). Cf. Protestant Ref. Church v. Tempelman, 249 Minn. 182, 192-93,
81 N.W.2d 839, 847-48 (1957).
"9 224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 625.
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common is the use of the word "trust." The cases involving hierarchial
polities still cling strongly to the Watson rule.4 °
The Supreme Court will soon review the Eastern Heights decision.41
It is timely, therefore, to examine the practical as well as the legal effect
of applying the "implied trust" doctrine to property disputes within a
hierarchical church.
First, the doctrine hinders the operation of the general church as it
seeks to adapt itself to the times. The general church makes statements
of doctrine and faith at the peril of being declared in error and losing
those churches whose congregations disagree. One or two such
instances would not appreciably affect the operation of the general
church, but a series of differences could be catastrophic.' By making
innovations so costly, the courts actually impose the status quo upon
hierarchical religious bodies.3
Second, as in Eastern Heights, any dissatisfied congregation could
claim a departure from the original tenets of faith by its church
hierarchy and by majority vote effectively operate contrary to the direc-
tives of the general church. The result is not unlike that system of gov-
ernment in congregational polities. It eliminates the binding nature of
the general church's decisions, a fundamental characteristic of hierarchi-
cal church bodies. The use of the "implied trust" doctrine, therefore,
imposes a different form of government upon the general church. Yet
this by no means classifies the church government as "congregational"
since the organization still operates under a representative system. Hier-
archical polities are by court decree forced into a type of limbo, suspended
between the congregational form on the one hand, and the hierarchical
form on the other. The process disregards the system of government
agreed upon in the church's constitution.4 4
"' See, e.g., Saint John's Presby. v. Central Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714
(Fla. 1958); Knight v. Presbytery of Western New York, 26 App. Div. 2d 19,
270 N.Y.2d 218 (1966).
"' See note 5 supra.
"An unusual situation occurred in Scotland. In 1900, two major Presbyterian
denominations, the Free Church of Scotland and the United Presbyterian Church
of Scotland, merged to form the United Free Church of Scotland. A very small mi-
nority of the former Free Church, represented by 24 out of a total of approximate-
ly 1100 ministers, contended that the merger violated the basic tenets of faith. They
were awarded the entire property holdings of the former Free Church. General
Ass. of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot.). Parlia-
ment could not accept such a result and ordered the property divided equitably be-
tween the dissident faction and the United Free Church. Churches (Scot.) Act,
5 Edw. 7, c. 12 (1905).
"I See Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62
MicH. L. Rzv. 419, 452 (1964).
" See Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966),
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Finally, the courts, as arms of the state, are forced to intrude into
the religious affairs of the church. 45 The "implied trust" doctrine re-
moves disputes over theological matters from ecclesiastical authorities
and forces them into secular courts. This result has questionable con-
stitutional validity46 and was one of the primary reasons for the doctrine's
rejection in Watson.47 The doctrine removes decisions on ecclesiastical
matters from the agencies 48 of the church that are most qualified to handle
such cases,49 thereby requiring judges and juries to delve into the "theo-
logical thicket." 50 The courts are not trained for such a function. It is
absurd that a jury of laymen be given the task of deciding whether the
highest constituted church court of a major religious denomination is in
error on matters of doctrine and faith."1
The inevitable conclusion is that the "implied trust" doctrine demands
a most undesirable result. But does the Watson rule present a suitable
solution to the problem? The answer lies in the determination of how
hierarchical church bodies actually hold property.
Most local churches are incorporated bodies and hold their property
through trustees. But holding formal title does not give the congregation
or the trustees absolute control. The Watson rule necessarily gives the
general church the power to define those persons belonging to its member
congregations. If certain members of the congregation deny the authority
of the general church, excluding this dissident faction from membership
in the congregation effectively eliminates the threat to the general church's
aff'd 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967); Presbytery of Indianapolis v. First United
Presby. Church, - Ind. -, 238 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968) ; BooK OF CHURCH
ORDER § 6-3. Cf. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). For criticism
of such a result as a court imposed system of uniform land tenure on churches, see
Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constiitu-
tional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1132-33 (1965).
Northside Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1967).
"Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). Cf. School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1(1947). See also W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 138 (1948). For
a treatment of the complexities of the constitutional question, see Com-
ment, JTudicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional
Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733-34.
"
8 The constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States actually
refers to these bodies as courts. BooK OF CHURCH ORDER, §§ 13-1, 14-5.
"" Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1871) ; Bouchelle v. Trustees
of the Presby. Congreg., 22 Del. Ch. 58, 64, 194 A. 100, 103 (1937); Sapp v. Cal-
laway, 208 Ga. 805, 811, 69 S.E.2d 734, 739 (1952).
" Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God,
- Md. -, -, 241 A.2d 691, 697 (1968).




authority. 52 In Eastern Heights, the Savannah Presbytery attempted to
exercise this prerogative by declaring that those who had disaffiliated
from the church were no longer members, and that those who desired
to maintain their general church connection would be allowed to use the
church.
53
At first glance this would appear to give excessive power to the ec-
clesiastical tribunals, but it does not appear so in the light of the Wat-
son rule. First, as has been mentioned, the application of the doctrine
demands fairness in procedure. 4 The court may inquire into the process
used and the legitimacy of the source. Second, in hierarchical polities
power is wielded by representative bodies whose authority comes from
the members of the general church as a whole."5 Finally, as Mr. Justice
Miller pointed out, those who join an ecclesiastical organization and de-
rive the benefits of their affiliation must accept the decisions of the prop-
er religious authorities. "[I]t would be a vain consent and would lead
to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed.""
If the local congregations of hierarchical church polities do not in fact
have ultimate control of their local property, who does? In the light of
Watson, the property must be said to be controlled by the membership
of the general church as a whole through the system of hierarchical church
courts. This result satisfies the general notions of the proper function of
representative government and is both practical and equitable5 7 Abiding
by the Watson precedent would, therefore, have the desirable effect of
maintaining the representative type of church government in this country,
while honoring the fundamental principles of the separation of church
2 "All of which leads one to the ineluctable conclusion that these dissident
lambs at one time happy and contented in the Central Church voluntarily
bounded the theological fold in search of what they thought were greener
ecclesiastical pastures but missed the boat and are now like the children of
Israel grazing in the wilderness of dispair absent a church home which no
human agency except perhaps intercession can restore."
Saint John's Presby. v. Central Presby. Church, 102 So. 2d 714, 719 (Fla. 1958).
Cf. Trustees of Presby. v. Westminister Presby. Church, 222 N.Y. 305, 118 N.E.
800 (1918).
224 Ga. at -, 159 S.E.2d at 693.
g' Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Arch., 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
Protestant Ref. Church v. Tempelman, 249 Minn. 182, 191, 81 N.W.2d 839,
847 (1957). See, e.g., BooK oF CHURCH ORDER, § 1-4.
"'Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871); accord, Barkley v.
Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (1913).
" See Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, 74 N.D. 400, 413, 22 N.W.2d 625, 631
(1946). See generally Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Dis-
putes-Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1134-35 (1965).
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and state."8 To hold otherwise would effectively destroy the concept of
representative church government in the United States."9
THOMAS B. ANDERSON
Social Welfare-The "Man in the House" Returns to Stay
Under the type of state welfare regulation popularly known as the
"substitute father" rule, children otherwise eligible for benefits under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children' program are denied assistance
if their natural parent maintains a continuing sexual relationship with
someone of the opposite sex. This person is deemed to be a non-absent
parent within the meaning of the Social Security Act, thus rendering
the family ineligible for AFDC payments. Whether this person is legally
obligated to support the children is irrelevant; whether he does in fact
contribute to their support is also irrelevant; eligibility under such a
rule is determined solely by the relationship between the parent (usually
the mother of the children) and the "substitute" (usually an unrelated
male).
In King v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court unanimously held Alabama's
"substitute father" rule invalid as inconsistent with Title IV of the So-
cial Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). Declining to reach the
constitutional issue presented, the Court found the Alabama provision
to be violative of the "Flemming Ruling"' and held that it defined
"sCf. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952); Goodson v.
Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99, 103 (S.D. Ala. 1966).
" Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (W.D. Mo. 1913).
1 Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter cited as AFDC] is
one of the major components of the public assistance program established by the
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). The program grants
aid to dependent, needy children who have been "deprived of parental support
or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent," and who live with any of certain enumerated rela-
tives. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (1964). For a thorough discussion of AFDC and its
predecessors, see W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
88 S. Ct. 2128 (1968).
'42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964). The ruling, given statutory approval in 1961
in response to a directive issued by the then Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education & Welfare, Arthur Flemming, provides that
A State plan for aid to dependent children may not impose an eligibility
condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the
basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while
the child continues to reside in the home. Assistance will therefore be
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